Russia focused on making contract servicemen the majority of its armed forces. The Russian military was primarily composed of conscripts, which it drafted twice a year, and contract servicemen - considered “enlisted professionals” who volunteered for several years of service. Successive Russian military reforms since the fall of the Soviet Union sought to abandon the old conscript-heavy mobilization army by consolidating formations and equipment, converting an unwieldy Soviet inheritance into a smaller standing force. To understand why this happened to one of the largest militaries in the world, we must start with examining the major tradeoffs made in Russian force design. The Russian armed forces are now pressed to sustain operations in Ukraine and attempting what amounts to a partial mobilization to stem the prospect of significant reversals on the battlefield. Consequently, the Russian army was optimized for a short and sharp war while lacking the capacity to sustain a major conventional conflict at “peace time” manning levels.
The Russian military also compromised by establishing a partial mobilization force. As it stands, the Russian military has a shortage of manpower - especially infantry. The full extent of Russia’s personnel weaknesses has become clear during this war. These decisions help explain many of the observed struggles the Russian armed forces have had in combined arms operations, fighting in urban environments, and attempts to hold terrain.
Some of the most significant problems being experienced by the Russian armed forces are the result of conscious choices and tradeoffs. Force structure reveals a great deal about a military and its assumptions of what wars it plans to fight and how it plans to fight them. Plans rarely survive first contact with an opponent and militaries invariably must adapt, but strategic force structure choices can prove decisive. Less attention has been paid, however, to Russian force structure and manpower issues as a critical element now shaping outcomes in this war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a deeply flawed military operation, from Moscow’s assumptions about an easy victory, to a lack of preparation, poor planning, and force employment.
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